Hypothesis of unequal perception
Let’s say there are two people talking: X and Y. X has three kinds of knowledge: Basic, Pertinent, Abstracted. Y has only two kinds of knowledge: Basic, Pertinent.
S1: If Y argues that X’s knowledge of the abstracted does not qualify him to be more knowledgeable than Y on qualitative terms because it is not useful knowledge,
S2: If X argues that Y’s lack of knowledge of the abstracted qualifies X to be regarded as qualitatively more knowledgeable than Y, and refutes Y by claiming Y cannot judge the usefulness of knowledge of the abstracted because Y does not have it,
A1: If Y counter-claims that X’s refutation of Y is simply because X possesses some other kind of knowledge and hopes that it will be useful,
C: Then Y’s independence of the knowledge of the abstracted and X’s dependence on the knowledge of the abstracted are either
- C1: Meaningless
- C2: Meaningful; if meaningful, then cannot be established in terms consistent with the other’s perception because there will always be reasonable circumstances in which the claimant can be tautological and the defendant, contradictory (i.e., incompleteness).
Effectively, this conclusion signifies the incapacity of anybody, through any logical means, to establish that there exists an absolute perception that everyone adheres to concerning an arbitrary object.
Here, the assumptions are
- V1: That the object being perceived may be engaged with the human senses through the knowledge of the object’s function and purpose
- V2: That the act of perceiving is contingent upon pre-existing knowledge and isn’t therefore a “learning experience”
- V3: That there is no way to demonstrate the usefulness of any knowledge independent of the perception modality (i.e., if there is no way to establish literally and meaningfully the significance of some knowledge – in the form of grammatically secured sentences or actions – then that knowledge pertains to a logically inconsistent hypothesis. E.g., sentiments.)